Evolutionary anthropologists have proposed that unilineal kinship promotes collective action and that patriliny occurs when the reproductive payoff from passing wealth to sons is greater than that for daughters. We assess both of these theoretical perspectives as well as indirect reciprocity and kin selection as possible contributors to patrilineal cooperation in the Dogon of Mali. The mean coefficient of relatedness for males (N p 4,724) in 31 Dogon patrilineages is r p 0.03, which is very low (akin to second cousins). However, relatedness in the 638 work-eat groups (WEGs) that make up the patrilineages is very high (r p 0.32), or greater than for half siblings. Indirect reciprocity and collective action explain cooperation among fictive kin in the patrilineage as a whole: the old men at the apex of the lineage help to stabilize cooperation by using their gerontocratic authority to punish cheaters. However, kin selection is a more useful theory for explaining cooperative behavior within WEGs, and both quantitative data and informants' statements show that WEGs are the more important unit for economic activity and family life. As expected for a patrilineal society, the Dogon derive a greater reproductive payoff from passing land and livestock to sons than to daughters.
Patrilineal descent was practiced in 47% of the 857 societies in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967) . Patrilineages are unilineal descent groups in which membership is passed from father to son down the male line from a common founding ancestor. Although kinship and descent is an old topic, it is one that has been revitalized by theoretical and empirical progress in evolutionary anthropology (reviewed in Shenk and Mattison 2011) . We begin by highlighting theory on unilineal descent and patrilineal cooperation with particular attention to functionalist interpretations. We consider norms that establish unambiguous group membership (Murdock 1949) , the need to solve collective action or coordination problems (Alvard 2003 (Alvard , 2011 Nolin 2011; Van den Berghe 1979) , reproductive payoffs from passing wealth to sons versus daughters (Hartung 1982; Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003; Mattison 2011) , paternity certainty (e.g., Strassmann et al. 2012) , indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987) , and inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964a (Hamilton , 1964b . Our goal is to determine whether any of these theoretical perspectives help us understand patrilineal cooperation in the Dogon of Mali, West Africa.
Theory on Patriliny

Collective Action
Cultural anthropologists of the twentieth century argued that unilineal descent creates corporate kinship groups with unambiguous group identity (Evans-Pritchard 1940; Fortes, Evans-Pritchard, and International Institute of African Languages and Cultures 1940; Murdock 1949:60-61; reviewed in Alvard 2003) . When descent is patrilineal, every man belongs to the lineage of his father; this simple rule of group identity obviates the actual complexity of kin relationships. Only full siblings share the identical network of genetic kin as they alone share both parents. Other sets of kin, such as half siblings and cousins, share some genetic kin but not others. Half siblings share only one parent; first cousins share only one or two of their four grandparents (depending on whether their parents are half or full siblings). Unilineal descent enables a large group to form with nonoverlapping membership and a clear norm as to who belongs and who does not.
Anthropologists have proposed that corporate kinship groups created by unilineal descent promote political solidarity in the context of interethnic strife and warfare (Ember, Ember, and Pasterna 1974; Otterbein and Otterbein 1965; Sahlins 1961; Service 1962) or in the context of the cooperative defense of resources (Goody 1962; Lowie 1920; RadcliffeBrown 1935) . In modern evolutionary terms, unilineal de-scent systems help to solve collective action problems (Alvard 2003) . It is difficult to organize kin for the purpose of collective action under a kindred system, in which descent is reckoned bilaterally, because of genetic conflicts of interest between kin who share different sets of relatives (Van den Berghe 1979) . Alliances would be unstable, and expectations about the persons with whom one should affiliate would diverge and lack uniformity (Nolin 2011) . According to Van den Berghe (1979) , belonging to a lineage, and sharing in the rewards of collective action, is a small price to pay for not being able to share lineage membership with the totality of one's genetic kin. Alvard (2003) investigated these ideas in the whaling community of Lamalera, Indonesia, where descent is reckoned patrilineally. He asked whether genetic kinship or lineage membership is more salient in explaining the composition of whaling crews. He found that lineage membership was 2.5 to 4 times more important than genetic kinship. In the Lamalera, whaling crews required 11 persons on average, and the size of sibships was too small for brothers to make up an entire crew. Lineages, on the other hand, were large enough to furnish the requisite man power. Alvard (2003) concludes that the Lamalera data are consistent with Van den Berghe's collective action hypothesis.
Whereas genetic kinship was less important than lineage membership for joining a Lamalera whaling crew, the reverse was true for affiliation during a Yanomamö axe fight. In the Yanomamö, genetic kinship explained 15% of the variation in affiliation between the parties, whereas 2% was explained by affinal relationships, and 0% was explained by lineage identity (Chagnon and Bugos 1979) . Similarly, in the Lamalera, genetic relatedness is a better predictor of food sharing by households than is lineage membership (Nolin 2011 ). It appears that whether lineage membership or genetic relatedness is a more important predictor of affiliation is context dependent (Alvard 2003 (Alvard , 2011 Nolin 2011) .
Patriliny or Matriliny?
Unilineal descent might be helpful for creating corporate kin groups and solving particular types of collective action problems, but additional theory is needed for understanding the form of unilineal descent: patriliny or matriliny. Under patrilineal descent, wealth is passed from fathers to sons, which is an adaptive strategy when wealth enhances the reproductive success of sons more than that of daughters (Hartung 1982; Trivers and Willard 1973) . When there is greater variance in male than in female reproductive success, sons have higher potential reproductive success. For example, if a son has more than 40 surviving offspring with multiple wives and a daughter has a maximum of 10 offspring, then the reproductive payoff for a son is four times higher than that for a daughter. Under these circumstances, passing wealth to sons so that they can be polygynous is a better strategy than passing wealth to daughters. A daughter can experience only one pregnancy at a time, whereas a son can potentially impregnate multiple wives almost simultaneously (Trivers 1972) . Cross-culturally, the males who succeed at being polygynous tend to be wealthier than monogamous males, and they tend to have more offspring because of their extra wives (Betzig 2012; Hartung 1982; Irons 1979 Irons , 1998 Nettle and Pollet 2008) . It is not surprising, therefore, that in polygynous societies parents preferentially pass wealth to sons (Hartung 1982) .
Another factor influencing the costs and benefits of passing wealth to sons or daughters is the risk for cuckoldrydefined in evolutionary biology as investment in genetically unrelated offspring (Trivers 1972) . A son can potentially be cuckolded if his wife is unfaithful, whereas a daughter physically gives birth, which means that she cannot be cuckolded. Wealth passed to a daughter, however, may be appropriated by the daughter's husband or father-in-law and used to support reproduction by these men with other women. Thus, wealth inherited by a daughter will not necessarily stay with the daughter's genes. In predicting whether a society will practice matriliny or patriliny, the two risks-one for the son and the other for the daughter-need to be taken into account. Holden, Sear, and Mace (2003) formulated a model to predict whether wealth should flow to sons or daughters for maximum reproductive advantage. Their model considers two factors: (1) the probability of paternity, P, and (2) the relative benefits of a unit of wealth for a son's reproduction, B s , and a daughter's reproduction, B d . They argue that when B s p B d , parents should invest equally in sons and daughters. However, because sons may not be the genetic fathers of their wives' offspring, the benefits of a unit of wealth for son's reproduction must be devalued by the probability of paternity, P. Investment in sons and daughters should be equal when B s # P p B d , which, after rearranging, is the same as B s /B d p 1/P. When B s /B d 1 1/P, then it is more adaptive to pass resources to sons, and when B s /B d ! 1/P, then it is more adaptive to pass resources to daughters. Thus, wealth inheritance by sons is adaptive if the additional benefit of resources to sons is sufficient to compensate for the risk of cuckoldry (Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003) .
Although this model is elegant and an advance over previous theory, we suggest that it should include a third factor, D, defined as the probability that wealth passed to a daughter supports her reproduction instead of being diverted (D) to support that of other women in her husband's family. Thus, investment in sons and daughters should be equal when B s # P p B d # D; investment should be biased to sons when B s # P 1 B d # D; investment should be biased toward daughters when B s # P ! B d # D. Most matrilineal societies do not actually pass wealth to daughters but instead pass it to sister's sons, a practice that reduces the risk, D, that wealth will be diverted by a daughter's husband or father-in-law. Holden, Sear, and Mace (2003) point out that their model can explain the association of patriliny with high paternity certainty and matriliny with low paternity uncertainty in cross-cultural studies (Alexander 1974; Flinn 1981; Gaulin and Schlegel 1980; Greene 1978; Hartung 1981 Hartung , 1985 Kurland 1979) . They also emphasize that patriliny and matriliny have different ecological associations because different kinds of resources are able to benefit the reproduction of sons more than daughters (Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003) . For example, animal husbandry is associated with patriliny because in many societies sons can use livestock for bride wealth, whereas livestock inherited by daughters might be used by their husbands to acquire additional wives (Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003) . Land has greater benefits for sons if it can be used to support polygyny or if a man without land is unable to attract a wife (Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003) . Holden, Sear, and Mace (2003) tested their model in two African societies, the patrilineal Gabbra and the matrilineal Chewa. In support of their hypothesis, the patrilineal Gabbra derived about three times as much reproductive benefit from wealth invested in sons compared with daughters, whereas there was no sex difference in the benefits of investing wealth for the matrilineal Chewa. In a follow-up study of the matrilineal Mosuo of southwestern China, the effect of land on reproduction was similar for sons and daughters, and daughter-biased inheritance was the norm (Mattison 2011) .
The foregoing perspectives suggest two parallel, albeit nonmutually exclusive, evolutionary approaches to the question of what explains patrilineal cooperation. Van den Berghe (1979) and Alvard (2003) follow a tradition that emphasizes the benefits individuals derive from collective action, whereas Holden, Sear, and Mace (2003) emphasize paternity certainty and the relative advantages of son-versus daughter-biased inheritance in different ecologies. Other evolutionary perspectives that might shed further light on patrilineal cooperation are also possible, such as indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987) and inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton 1964a (Hamilton , 1964b . Alexander (1987) developed the concept of "indirect reciprocity" to refer to situations in which beneficial acts are directed toward individuals who have been observed cooperating with others. According to Alexander, "reputation" is the means by which cheaters are identified and discriminated against. Nowak and Sigmund (1998) presented a mathematical model of indirect reciprocity that supported Alexander's verbal arguments. The role of direct (Trivers 1971 ) and indirect (Alexander 1987 ) reciprocity in the evolution and maintenance of cooperation in humans is widely accepted (reviewed in West, El Mouden, and Gardner 2011); however, it has not previously been invoked to help understand why the members of patrilineages cooperate with each other. Hamilton (1964a Hamilton ( , 1964b showed that natural selection will favor genes or traits that promote an individual's "inclusive fitness." Under Hamilton's Rule, a behavior will be favored by selection if rB 1 C, where r refers to the coefficient of relatedness between ego and alter, B refers to the benefits to alter, and C refers to the costs to ego (Hamilton 1963 (Hamilton , 1964a (Hamilton , 1964b (Hamilton , 1970 . As stated by West, El Mouden, and Gardner (2011:233), "inclusive fitness is not just an accounting method, it is the component of reproductive success an organism can influence and what organisms should appear to be maximizing."
Reciprocity and Inclusive Fitness
Theory relevant to understanding patrilineal cooperation is wide-ranging. In the foregoing discussion we briefly highlighted a few of the potential theoretical elements: norms that establish unambiguous group membership, the need to solve collective action or coordination problems, reproductive payoffs from passing wealth to sons versus daughters, paternity certainty, indirect reciprocity, and inclusive fitness. We now turn to a case study of the Dogon of Mali. We ask the following questions: What is the basis for cooperation in Dogon patrilineages? Which of the foregoing arguments are applicable? What new syntheses or modifications of existing theory are needed? Before attempting to answer these questions, it is helpful to consider the main features of Dogon ethnography that are critical to understanding patrilineal cooperation, namely, subsistence, social structure, political authority, marriage, and religion. After establishing the ethnographic context, we present the methods and results of a more fine-tuned effort to discover what the men in Dogon patrilineages are cooperating over and why.
Ethnography
Subsistence Traditionally, the Dogon lived along the Bandiagara Escarpment in villages built along the scree slope or higher up on the plateau on exposed rock near to water sources and arable land (Bouju 1984) . During the colonial period of the mid-twentieth century, after the threat of slave raiding had diminished, the Dogon established villages along the Seno-Gondo plains to the east of the escarpment (Huet 1994) . During the rainy season, they use iron hoes fashioned by the local blacksmiths to cultivate cereal crops (millet, sorghum, rice, and fonio) (Bouju 1984:127-128; Huet 1994; Paulme 1940) . In the cool dry season, villages that have a durable water source grow onions as a cash crop, and the revenues are used to purchase millet after poor cereal harvests caused by drought, locusts, or poor soils (Strassmann and Warner 1998) . The Dogon practice animal husbandry on a small scale compared with nearby pastoralists such as the Fulani, who are cattle herders. The main livestock for the Dogon are sheep and goats, although wealthier families might own cattle (Strassmann and Warner 1998) .
Social Structure and Political Authority
The Dogon have three castes: farmers, blacksmiths, and leatherworkers; some villages also had slaves until the famines of the early twentieth century (Jolly 2004:438; Paulme 1940) . The fundamental family unit for the Dogon is the work-eat group (WEG), defined as the people who work together in the millet fields during the rainy season and who eat from the same harvest (Strassmann and Warner 1998; see also Bouju 1984:90-92, 153 ). WEGs have two or three generations of living males plus their spouses and children. Members of a WEG respect the directives of the WEG boss, called the gini gono ku banga. WEG bosses have considerable authority because they are the patriarchs who make the day-to-day decisions and direct the labor of the people who work together in the cereal fields. The rule that determines the identity of the WEG boss is simple: he is the eldest male in the WEG. Throughout Dogon country, WEGs are nested in patrilineages (gini) that are nested in villages (ana) that are nested in clans (tige) and tribes. According to mythology, the ancestors of the four Dogon tribes were brothers who arrived together from Mande (Huet 1994) .
Above the level of WEG boss, male authority is vested in the oldest man of the lineage. This elder has a more important religious role than the WEG boss because he is responsible for rites associated with worship of the male ancestors shared by the lineage, including the performance of sacrifices and maintenance of the ancestral house for the lineage, known as the Gina (Strassmann informants). The eldest of the lineage heads is the most powerful person in a Dogon village. Strassmann observed this high elder exhorting people to participate in collective actions associated with small development projects that she organized at the people's behest (e.g., a dam, a dike, a road, and a well). She also observed him standing on his rooftop and announcing that livestock needed to be penned to stop them from eating young shoots of millet.
The concept of village chief was introduced by the Toucouleur and the French to enable the collection of a head tax; the imposition of chiefs to assist the colonial government to collect taxes was a pattern that prevailed throughout francophone Africa (Manning 1998) . Although chiefs interacted with colonial officials and, after independence in 1960, with functionaries of the Malian government, they have less power in internal matters than lineage elders; importantly, chiefs enjoy no special rights to land.
Marriage
Traditionally, Dogon spouses came from different lineages (Paulme 1940 ) although strict exogamy is no longer the rule. Over at least the past 30 years or longer, no formal exchange of women between lineages has occurred at the study site. The Dogon are polygynous, and the custom was for men to have up to two wives at one time or, more rarely, three (Paulme 1940) . However, under the influence of Islam, a few men now have four wives (Strassmann 2003) . A more in-depth discussion of Dogon marriage (Bouju 1984:57-63; Paulme 1940) and the reproductive consequences of polygyny can be found elsewhere (Strassmann 1997b (Strassmann , 2003 (Strassmann , 2011 .
Religion
The Dogon have one god, Ama, and their religion is integrated with the agricultural cycle (Strassmann informants). Spiritual appeals for continued subsistence occur at the Bulo, a time for sacrifices to ask God for a good rainy season and a plentiful harvest. The Bulo occurs at the approach of the rainy season in late May or June and is marked by sacrifices of blood or millet porridge at the altars to Ama and the shrines for the cults of Binu, Yomoru, and Lebe (Bouju 1984:139; Calame Griaule 1968:49; Griaule 1940; Strassmann informants) . Only men perform sacrifices or practice the rites associated with these cults. Young boys don a mask of leaves from a particular tree (Lannea acida) and chase their juniors (and little girls) with a whip (Bouju 1984:142; Griaule 1938:271; Pern, Alexander, and Time-Books 1982) . Men dance with umbrellas or other props, such as the fur of wild animals. The Dogon New Year, called Goru, is celebrated at the end of December and is the time to thank God for the millet harvest. During Goru, there are sacrifices at the ancestral house of the lineage (the Gina), when millet beer, millet porridge, or chicken blood is poured over the Wageun, which represent the ancestors. The oldest lineage head of the village is the first and foremost person to offer benedictions for the new year (Strassmann informants) .
The other main religious events are the yimi yana (funerals) and dama, which usually take place in April and early May, respectively. Masked dancing is performed at both, although on a costlier and grander scale for a dama, which signifies the lifting of mourning for a deceased man. The Dogon ceremonies (bulo, goru, yimi yana, and dama) require the preparation of millet beer and food and are occasions for socializing and hosting large numbers of visitors. A dama is an event in which the old men are in charge and the whole village participates-the women as spectators and in service roles such as preparers of food and millet beer (Strassmann informants). The Sigi happens every 60 years and begins in the village of Yougo Dogorou, then goes from village to village (the next one will begin in 2027). In the Sigi, men of multiple villages line up by age to dance in the formation of a giant snake, the Lebe (Griaule 1948) . In males, power and rights to land increase directly with age (Bouju 1984) , and the Sigi underscores the male age system. Informants stated that a man who tries to jump the queue will die. A dama cannot be performed for a man who has not participated in a Sigi. Moreover, until a man's dama has taken place, his soul cannot join the ancestors during the goru rites. At the study site, the Dogon religion was still vibrant throughout the 1980s; it is now more localized, and Islam is rapidly winning converts (Strassmann et al. 2012 ).
Methods
Study Site
The study population consisted of 9,675 people who belong to one clan that lives in 12 villages on the Bandiagara Escarpment in Central Mali. To protect subject anonymity, we are withholding identifying information about the population. Informed consent was obtained from each participant, and this study was approved by the village elders, the Malian government, and the University of Michigan Health and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board (H03-00001208-R2). For two and a half years (1986) (1987) (1988) , Strassmann lived in a small house in one of the 12 villages, and by 2015 she and her team from the University of Michigan had conducted more than 10 person-years of fieldwork. The research was carried out from a base in the original study village, and the 11 other villages were accessed on foot, as they are within 4 km. French is the official language of Mali, but it is not widely spoken at the field site. Hence, Strassmann conducted most of her fieldwork in a dialect of the Dogon language called Tòro Sò.
Calculations of Relatedness
Patrilineal pedigrees were generated from oral histories (Strassmann et al. 2012 ; CA1 online supplement A). Kurapati wrote a program in Python (ver. 2.7, 64 bit, http://www .python.org) that reads a .csv spreadsheet that contains data for each individual in each patrilineage: person's ID, father's ID, mother's ID, patrilineage ID, WEG ID, sex, year of birth, and survival status in the year 2015 (alive or dead). For each pair of living males belonging to the same patrilineage, the algorithm identifies, in a nonredundant fashion, all the different ancestors that each pair has in common and calculates their coefficient of relatedness through each unique closest common ancestor. The program also separately calculates relatedness through closest common ancestors that are male versus female. The mean relatedness for each patrilineage is the average relatedness across all pairs. For the WEG relatedness calculations, the program similarly calculates and averages the relatedness between all possible pairs of living males belonging to the same WEG. The program is publicly available at https:// github.com/ntkurapati/relatedness_analysis.
Village Map
A map was made in 1986 of the village of 460 residents that Strassmann lived in during her fieldwork in the 1980s, and it is published here for the first time. Distances were estimated by counting paces between points after calibrating the researcher's number of paces per meter using a retractable metal tape measure. Compass bearings were used for the calculation of angles. At that time GPS was not yet available for use in research. The map has not been updated to reflect changes occurring after 1986 because we are more interested in the historical situation than recent influences from outside.
Field Measurements
Fields were measured using a compass to determine angles and a meter tape and pacing to measure the sides (CA1 supplement A; Strassmann and Warner 1998). The results have been used in the calculation of a wealth variable that has been used in statistical models in several publications (e.g., Strassmann and Warner 1998). Here we go beyond this earlier work by providing more information about land and crops and their control by lineages.
Results
Residence
Coresidence is one manifestation of cooperation. Evidence that the men of a lineage live together would therefore strongly suggest that they are also cooperating. Hence we tested the hypothesis that the compounds of WEGs of the same lineage are closer together to each other than they are to WEGs of other lineages in the same village. As shown on the map ( fig. 1) , we found that this expectation was supported: the WEGs of lineages 1, 3, and 4 are segregated in their own neighborhoods of the village.
The prediction was only partially supported for lineage 2, which is exceptionally small and had only four married males who lived amid lineage 1. Based on the residential proximity between lineages 1 and 2, one might predict greater cooperation between these two lineages than for lineages living farther apart, such as lineages 1 and 4. The map also suggests that lineage 4 is less integrated with the other lineages of the village because it is the only lineage for which no compound abuts a compound of another lineage. The lessor integration of lineage 4 predicts that it might also be less integrated in other realms, such as land ownership and religion (see below).
Three out of 64 (5%) of married men lived matrilocally with their mother's brother, and the rest lived patrilocally. Matrilocal residences are noted on the map by a d next to the WEG number ( fig. 1 ). These men were exceptional in that they were better integrated with their matriline than their patriline. Based on physical proximity, the anthropologist (Strassmann) was more integrated with lineage 1 than with the other lineages. She lived in a house (j) that belonged to lineage 1, and she was considered a daughter of a man in lineage 1 who was also the chief of the village.
Genetic Relatedness
Knowing the genetic relatedness of the men of a lineage and a WEG is helpful for understanding the potential for kin selection to operate at either or both of these two levels (Hamilton 1964a (Hamilton , 1964b . The overall mean coefficient of relatedness between the males (N p 4,724) in the 31 patrilineages was r p 0.030 (SEM p 0.0004). This value ranged from r p 0.006 in the largest patrilineage with 587 living males to r p 0.150 in the smallest lineage with only five living males ( fig. 2A) . The mean relatedness through male ancestors was 0.023 (SEM p 0.0003) and through female ancestors was 0.008 (SEM p 0.0001); thus, 75% of the overall relatedness was through male and 25% through female ancestors. The foregoing analyses imposed no age restriction and instead included all living males in the lineages. Restricting the analysis to males born before 1980 who were at least 25 years of age did not greatly alter the results. The mean coefficient of relatedness between adult males (age 25 years and older) in the 31 patrilineages was r p 0.028 (SEM p 0.0005) and the percent relatedness through male and female ancestors was 73% and 27%, respectively.
The 31 lineages were made of 638 WEGs. Whereas the mean relatedness of the males in the 31 patrilineages was very low, the mean relatedness of males belonging to the same WEG was high (figs. 2B, 3). The overall mean coefficient of relatedness between the living males (of all ages) in WEGs was 0.316 (SEM p 0.002; fig. 3 ). The mean number of living males per WEG was 7.3 with a range of 2-44, and the mean number of females in these same WEGs was 7.4 (range 0-63). As our focus was on the relatedness between males, we omitted WEGs from all analyses if they had !2 living males. The largest WEG in the 12 villages had 106 living people (43 males and 63 females). If the analysis was restricted to persons born before 1980, the overall coefficient of relatedness between the living males was 0.274 (SEM p 0.002).
In summary, the mean relatedness of males belonging to the same patrilineage was 0.03, indicating a separation by five meioses (generations) on average (see Hill et al. 2011; Lukas et al. 2005) . The mean relatedness of males belonging to the same WEG was 0.32, which is slightly over two meioses and is higher than the average relatedness of half brothers (r p 0.25; fig. 3 ). Thus, mean relatedness within lineages is very low, but mean relatedness within WEGs is high. We also compared the Y STR haplotypes for the men of the four lineages in the primary study village. The men of the four lineages have essentially the same haplotype, with differences at only one or two of 14 loci that were consistent with mutation (Strassmann et al. 2012 ).
Defense
Corporate kinship groups created by unilineal descent have been hypothesized to promote political solidarity in the context of interethnic strife and warfare (Ember, Ember, and Pasterna 1974; Otterbein and Otterbein 1965; Sahlins 1961; Service 1962) . Before colonial times, Dogon villages were situated in defensive locations that were meant to thwart Mossi, Fulani, and Toucouleur slave raiders who saw the Dogon as desirable prey because they were not Muslim (Bouju 1984:20; Huet 1994:53-63) . The village in figure 1 is hidden by a rocky mount to the east and to the north; to the west it is protected by a gorge. Informants referred to it as a "hidden village." They said that in the nineteenth century the people of lineage 4 lived for a time on the other side of the gorge, where their old house footings are still visible, but after losses to slave raiders they came back to the present side. Dogon villages are also known for architectural features that serve the purpose of defense, including narrow streets that twist and turn to thwart cavalry and confuse strangers (Bouju 1984; Huet 1994:98) . These features are evident on the map in figure 1. Villages built on the talus of the cliff can be steeply sloped and full of boulders, making them even more difficult to attack (Cazes 1993) . In sum, village location and architecture played an important role in defense. We interviewed informants to find out whether lineages played a role in the defense of persons during slave raids. Informants said that lineages played no role; instead, each person would individually seek to hide in bushes, caves, and in secret rooms hidden in the older houses. The raids came unexpectedly and took people by surprise.
Land Ownership
It has been hypothesized that the members of unilineal descent groups cooperate in the defense of land (Goody 1962; Lowie 1920; Radcliffe-Brown 1935) . To begin our scrutiny of this hypothesis, we considered the different kinds of crops cultivated and the number and area of fields for each of the four lineages in our primary study village. According to our data, the village cultivated a total of 538 fields in 1986, including 244 millet fields, 63 fields sown in millet and sorghum, 36 sorghum fields, 93 fonio fields, and 102 rice fields (fig. 4A ). The area of the 538 cereal fields was 137 hectares. In 1986, the population of residents (excluding both transient visitors and the four-person blacksmith family) was 456 people. The hectares cultivated per person for lineages 1, 2, 3, and 4 were 0.28, 0.27, 0.34, and 0.25 hectares per person, respectively. Overall, a mean of 0.3 hectares was cultivated per person.
Areas under cultivation-as well as rocks, streams, and other topographic features-have names. The 137 hectares of cereal fields were at 94 different named locations, and in the dry season, onions were cultivated on 4.4 hectares of gardens at 17 different named locations (fig. 4B ). The most common pattern was for the cereal fields at a given location to be owned by only one of the four lineages ( fig. 5A ). The next most common situation was for two lineages to cultivate fields at the same location. It was rare for three or four lineages to farm fields at the same location ( fig. 5A ). The total area cultivated at locations that had two lineages was larger than at locations that had one lineage and was much larger than for locations that had three or four lineages ( fig. 5A) .
We tested the hypothesis that two pairings were more common than expected by chance: lineage 1 with 3 and lineage 1 with 2. This hypothesis was based on knowledge that the women of lineages 1 and 3 share a single menstrual hut (see map in fig. 1 ) and that lineages 1 and 2 reside in the same neighborhood of the village ( fig. 1) . The results support the hypothesis that lineages 1 and 3, but not lineages 1 and 2, were more likely than expected by chance to farm at the same location ( fig. 5B) . Thus, the data on fields support the expectation that lineages 1 and 3 are affiliative. Lineage 3 also farmed less land than expected by itself ( fig. 5B ). We also tested the hypothesis that lineage 4 was less likely than expected by chance to farm where the other lineages were also farming. This hypothesis was based on the knowledge that lineage 4 is physically farther separated from the other Figure 2 . Mean relatedness in lineages (A) and work-eat groups (WEGs; B) by number of living males present in the lineage and WEG, respectively. The curves were fit using Loess nonparametric regression (Cleveland and Devlin 1988) . lineages of the village ( fig. 1) . The results confirm that lineage 4 does farm more area by itself than expected by chance ( fig. 5B) . Thus, lineage 4 is less affiliative with the other lineages in regard to land.
In sum, most locations for cereal crops are farmed by the members of only one lineage, implying that the lineage that cultivates a given site has been able to defend it and keep out unwanted members of other lineages. The two lineages that were most often farming at the same location were lineages 1 and 3. When we queried informants about this result, they attributed it to the fact that the founders of these two lineages were full brothers. Ethnographers have reported that full siblings are much more affiliative than half siblings in the Dogon (Bouju 1984:47; Strassmann 2011) .
Land Inheritance
The land of the primary study village is under four different kinds of ownership with different implications for inheritance. The types of ownership and the approximate percentage of the total area of land farmed by ownership type are as follows: intervillage fields !1%, lineage fields 24%, lineage segment fields 11%, and WEG fields 64%.
Intervillage fields are owned by three lineages in the primary study village (lineages 1, 3, and 4) and four lineages in two nearby villages that trace ancestry to the same person. He was a great hunter who originally came from another village where he had committed a murder, causing him to be expelled and forced to found his own lineage. Lineage fields are owned by an entire lineage and are near to the family compounds for that lineage in a village. Lineage fields trace back to the earliest days of the lineage when land was more plentiful and people did not have to walk any distance to farm. Together with the intervillage fields, they are among (N p 94 locations) . Area of locations (triangles) farmed by one or more lineages. B, Total area (ha) of locations that each lineage farmed exclusively by itself (daggers) as well as the area that each lineage farmed in locations where another lineage also had fields. Asterisks indicate statistically significant standardized Pearson residuals. We can be 95% confident that lineage 1 farmed more area than expected in locations where lineage 3 also farmed. Conversely, lineage 3 farmed more area than expected in locations where lineage 1 also farmed. Lineage 3 farmed less area than expected in locations where it farmed by itself. Lineage 4 farmed more area than expected in locations where it farmed by itself. No significant associations emerged in pairings that include lineage 2. A color version of this figure is available online. the oldest. When the most senior man of a lineage has died, a redistribution of fields occurs immediately after the second bulo following his death (Strassmann informants) . The man who is now the oldest gets the best of the lineage fields and the next oldest gets the second best, the third oldest the third best, and so on by order of age (Bouju 1984:104-105; Strassmann informants) .
It is helpful to consider an example of the increase in land for a WEG boss who has become the oldest man of his lineage. In 1986, a man in WEG 18 was 58 years of age, and three living males were older than he was in his lineage. The family was so poor that they sold the aluminum door to their house, and they invited the anthropologist to join them to eat grilled rat. In 2015, this same man was 87 years of age and he had become the oldest man in his lineage. The area of cereal fields that his family owned had increased from 1.9 to 6.5 hectares, and the quality of the land had also improved. In 2015 he was blind and physically powerless, yet his seniority entitled him to the best lineage fields. This elder now had so much land that he loaned out 2.1 hectares, and he also had to leave fields fallow for lack of sufficient labor in his WEG.
Lineage segment fields circulate from WEG to WEG within the lineage segment rather than across the entire lineage. WEG fields are owned by an individual WEG and are inherited by the sons of the WEG boss, with the oldest son getting the best land. In the primary study village, 64% of the land was owned by WEGs and only 24% by lineages; thus by land area, WEG fields were more than twice as important as lineage fields. Hence, although we found some support for the hypothesis that the members of patrilineal descent groups cooperate in the defense of land (Goody 1962; Lowie 1920; Radcliffe-Brown 1935) , cooperation to defend land at the level of the WEG was more prominent.
Religion
As the Dogon religion is integrated into the agricultural cycle, and each lineage performs sacred rites before planting (bulo) and after the harvest (goru), we considered the hypothesis that religion is an arena for collective action on the part of lineages (see Atran and Henrich 2010; Irons 2001; Purzycki and Arakchaa 2013; Sosis and Bressler 2003) . Altars and shrines for particular lineages imply cooperation and coordination by the lineage members, especially by the males who perform the sacrifices and libations. When an altar or shrine is associated with a given lineage, it functions on behalf of that lineage, assisting with the desire for fertility, good health, and a successful millet harvest so that the lineage may grow and prosper.
A shrine or altar that serves multiple lineages in multiple villages belonging to one clan requires clanwide cooperation. At our study site there is a sacred grove of trees with red flowers, and this religious site protects the entire clan of 12 villages. According to informants, each lineage of each village of the clan was in a rotation to provide a human sacrifice for the grove. To capture a victim, four or so young men would roam the bush looking for a person who was alone and vulnerable. They would kill him on the spot and collect his blood as a libation more powerful than millet porridge, beer, or animal blood. A finger would be cut off as proof that the blood was human. If a lineage did not comply, then it had to give a field to the lineage that procured the victim. Such a field was paid in blood and could never be retrieved. That human sacrifice existed in the Dogon is agreed on by all of our informants as is its modern replacement by the sacrifice of dogs. For example, a dog is still sacrificed at each dama.
At the opposite extreme from clanwide religious sites are the fetishes that people keep in their homes and granaries. These derive their power from the lineage altars and shrines. They can be personal or belong to several related males, such as a father and his sons; the cooperation and coordination they require is minimal.
To gain a better understanding of who was cooperating and coordinating with whom, we examined the affiliations of each of the religious sites in the primary study village. The sites that are within the confines of the village are shown on the map in figure 1 , and others are in the vicinity of the village, making a total of 19 sites in all. Four sites were shared by lineages 1, 3, and 4 that descend from the common ancestor who was a great hunter (mentioned above); among the other sites, five were exclusively for lineage 1, three were exclusively for lineage 2, two were exclusively for lineage 3, and five were exclusively for lineage 4. We observe a parallelism with the situation for cereal cropland ownership in that lineage 3 had less land than expected at locations where it was the sole lineage farming cereals ( fig. 5B ), and it also had only two religious sites exclusively for itself. The other two large lineages (1 and 4) had five sites each. Thus, lineages that controlled more cereal crop locations by farming them exclusive of other lineages also had more lineage-specific altars and shrines. It is possible that this result is mere coincidence; however, that seems unlikely given that the productivity of the land and the resulting prosperity of the lineage is the main function served by the sacred sites and by the two Dogon fetes of bulo and goru. Perhaps lineages that had more cropland to defend and to cultivate also had greater recourse to supernatural help.
The Dogon religion promotes the collective interests of group members at a variety of social levels: the family, the lineage, the clan, and the tribe. Our informants stated that the lineage-level altars and shrines are more important than personal or WEG-level fetishes. Religion and agricultural pursuits are integrated because a major function of religion is to promote a successful harvest, on which fertility, health, prosperity, and the growth of the lineage ultimately depend.
Paternity Certainty
In the Dogon, land is a scarce resource that can be inherited, and men in wealthier WEGs are more likely to be polygynous and to achieve higher reproductive success than men in poorer WEGs (Strassmann 2003) . According to theory dis-cussed above (Hartung 1982; Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003; Trivers and Willard 1973) , the Dogon should therefore practice patriliny, but only under two conditions: paternity certainty is high, and resources passed to daughters are vulnerable to appropriation by husbands or fathers-in-law. Both of these conditions hold. Paternity certainty in the Dogon is greater than 98% (Strassmann et al. 2012) , which is comparable to that of the societies having the highest levels of paternity certainty (Anderson 2006; Larmuseau et al. 2013) . Moreover, resources passed to daughters (especially land and livestock) are easily diverted, and it is not surprising, therefore, that daughters inherit only a few bowls, jewelry items, and other portable goods of low value (compared with land and livestock) from their mothers and maternal grandmothers (Strassmann informants). Thus, the Dogon are a good fit with the hypothesis that people practice patriliny when it pays off reproductively.
The Dogon are also a society in which men go to great effort to protect paternity certainty, which is accomplished through the help of menstrual taboos embedded in the indigenous religion (Strassmann 1992 (Strassmann , 1996 Strassmann et al. 2012 ). In the 1980s, the Dogon were a natural fertility population with a median of nine live births per woman; even today, contraceptive use is rare. The taboo that requires a Dogon woman to spend five nights sleeping at a menstrual hut forces her to reveal to her husband and to his entire lineage the timing of the fecund part of her interbirth interval. Dogon women of reproductive age do not experience a "regular, monthly period" unless they are infertile (Strassmann 1997a; Strassmann and Warner 1998) . Instead, they spend 9 months pregnant and a median of 20 months in lactational amenorrhea often followed by only one or two ovulations and menses before becoming pregnant again (Strassmann 1997a; Strassmann and Warner 1998) . People know that a parous woman who is menstruating has come out of lactational amenorrhea and will soon conceive. Thus, the husband and his lineage are especially vigilant of a fertile woman who has menstruated. If she commits adultery, then the offspring will be rejected, especially if it is a son who will inherit land (Strassmann 1992) .
The hypothesis that Dogon menstrual taboos promote paternity certainty has previously been tested, and we will only briefly summarize the main evidence. It might be expected that women cheat on the menstrual taboos by going to the menstrual hut whenever they feel like it and skipping out at other times. However, hormonal data showed that the women respected the taboos so as to secure paternal care for their offspring (Strassmann 1996) . Further, in a genetic study of 1,706 father-son pairs, cuckoldry (which refers to a son not having been sired by his putative father) was more than twice as common if his mother did not go to a menstrual hut. In particular, the prevalence of cuckoldry was 1.3% if his mother used the menstrual hut and 2.9% if she did not. It was possible to do this comparison because the advent of world religions (Christianity and Islam) brought release to some women from the menstrual taboos (Strassmann et al. 2012 ).
Informants shared the belief that the menstrual huts enabled men to "witness" the timing of women's menses so as to make informed guesses as to the probability of paternity. These informants came from many different villages and made similar statements across a time span of 30 years (Strassmann 1992; Strassmann et al. 2012) . They also stated that menstrual blood will desecrate the religious objects and sites that protect against famine and illness; however, these pollution beliefs can be understood as part of the enforcement mechanism for getting women to obey the taboos. The menstrual hut was viewed by the Dogon as so important that traditionally it was the first structure to be built when a new village was founded. In sum, a large body of evidence supports the hypothesis that the menstrual taboos of the Dogon promote paternity certainty.
What role is played by lineages? It turns out that lineages do play a role as the members of a lineage collectively monitor the reproductive status of their set of wives. The more pairs of eyes that watch a woman, the less likely it is that she can hide the truth about being pregnant from adultery. The fact that the lineage as a whole participates is shown by a strong tendency in Dogon villages for there to be one menstrual hut (punduru) for the women and one shade shelter (toguna) for the men per patrilineage. For example, the village of Tiogou has five lineages, five menstrual huts, and five shade shelters. The women at the menstrual hut are usually in full view of the men sitting under their shade shelter. When the shade shelter is not very close to the menstrual hut, then the hut is close to a well or other place that people walk past so that the women are easily observed.
The primary study village is unusual in that it has three shade shelters and two menstrual huts-almost as if there were a missing menstrual hut. Informants said that there always had been only two menstrual huts in their village. As shown on the map ( fig. 1) , the women of lineages 1, 2, and 3 share a menstrual hut, and the women of lineage 4 have their own menstrual hut. It makes sense that the women of lineage 4 have a separate menstrual hut because their men are less affiliative with the men of the other lineages in multiple respects discussed above. Because the men of lineages 1 and 2 share a single shade shelter, it is expected that their women share a menstrual hut. It is curious that the women of lineage 3 also share the same hut. However, as shown on the map, the two shade shelters for these three lineages are both positioned so that the men under them can see the women at the communal menstrual hut.
Two possible interpretations exist as to the role of lineages in mate guarding the wives of their members (Strassmann 1992 (Strassmann , 1996 Strassmann et al. 2012) . One possibility is that if a man in the lineage is cuckolded, then the entire lineage is cuckolded because the descendants of the cuckold will gain access to lineage fields. To avoid this outcome, men may watch over each other's wives. We could call this collective action to protect the "purity" of the lineage, or descent from a common ancestor. Another possibility is that the men of the lineage help to mate guard each other's wives through indirect reciprocity. Our data favor the latter hypothesis because the men of a lineage are not very closely related in the first place; hence, cuckoldry of the lineage hardly makes a difference. However, it matters a great deal for a man to be 50% or 0% related to his offspring.
Discussion
What explains patrilineal cooperation? To answer this question, we will consider the Dogon data in the light of the hypotheses that focus on collective action (e.g., Alvard 2003; Nolin 2011) , patriliny versus matriliny (e.g., Hartung 1982; Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003; Mattison 2011) , paternity certainty (Strassmann et al. 2012) , indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987) , and inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964a (Hamilton , 1964b . These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive.
Collective Action
The men who belong to the same lineage live together in the same neighborhood, which suggests that they are cooperating. Otherwise, they might naturally disperse. In particular, the men of a lineage cooperate and coordinate to worship at their sacred sites. One site required lineages to cooperate and coordinate with the other lineages of the clan in 12 different villages. In the primary study village, there were a total of 19 sacred sites, of which four were shared by three lineages and 10 were for individual lineages. A sacred site for a lineage implies integration across the lineage and the need for the men of different WEGs to come together not only on their own behalf but also on behalf of the lineage as a whole. Thus, collective action is an important part of patrilineal cooperation. The oldest man of the lineage shoulders a greater part of the burden to enforce collective action because it is he who has primary responsibility for seeing that the proper sacrifices are performed during the fetes of bulo and goru, and he is also responsible for maintaining the ancestral house for the lineage (Gina; Strassmann informants).
In return, he is rewarded by being entitled to the lineage's best land-another important arena for collective action by lineages. Religion and agricultural pursuits are integrated because a major function of religion is to promote a plentiful millet harvest-from which all else follows (Strassmann informants). Dogon lineages collectively defend cereal fields, and two social norms help to reduce conflict: (1) the person who first brought the land into cultivation is the owner-after he dies the fields are inherited by his descendants-and (2) among the descendants, rights to fields respect seniority by age (Bouju 1984:105) . Most locations where cereal crops were planted were farmed by the members of only one lineage, implying that these sites were successfully defended. Lineages 1 and 3 farmed at the same location more often than expected by chance, and they were also affiliative in other realms. We are unsure why that is the case; however, informants were satisfied by the explanation that the founding ancestors of these two lineages were full brothers.
Patriliny or Matriliny?
Among the Dogon, land is both a heritable and defensible resource, and it is used by males to increase their reproductive success through polygyny (Strassmann 2003) . Paternity certainty is greater than 98% (Strassmann et al. 2012) , and the risk that land inherited by daughters would be appropriated by husbands is high. Thus, Dogon males get a better reproductive payoff from bequeathing wealth to sons than to daughters. This area of theory is helpful for explaining why the Dogon practice patriliny instead of matriliny (Hartung 1982; Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003) . However, it cannot explain why there is cooperation between the different WEGs of the lineage or between different lineages of the same clan. Theory on collective action and patriliny versus matriliny provides complementary explanations for patrilineal cooperation; neither framework is sufficient on its own.
Paternity Certainty
The reproductive payoff from passing wealth to sons needs to be multiplied by the probability that the son is a genetic offspring (Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003) . Thus, the high paternity certainty (198%) of Dogon males is helpful for understanding patrilineal cooperation. Dogon males do not have a passive attitude toward ensuring their paternity. Instead, they have embedded in religion the belief that menstrual blood will desecrate sacred objects, forcing menstruating women to sleep at a special hut. Use of the menstrual huts reduced cuckoldry by more than 50% (Strassmann et al. 2012) .
Indirect Reciprocity
The men of the lineage mate guard each other's wives through indirect reciprocity. Each man pays the cost of not cuckolding his fellows in exchange for the benefit of being more secure in regard to his own paternity. The lineage elders help to prevent cheating by taking land away from any man in the lineage who breaks this social contract (Strassmann et al. 2012) . The elders are powerless to punish men from other lineages; however, when the mate-guarding system is working, the men from outside pose less of a threat. We posit that defense against cuckoldry is one of the major arenas for cooperation by the men who belong to the same patrilineage.
Inclusive Fitness
The mean relatedness of males belonging to the same patrilineage was 0.03, indicating a separation by five generations on average (see Hill et al. 2011; Lukas et al. 2005) . On account of this low level of genetic relatedness, kin selection (Hamilton 1964a (Hamilton , 1964b ) is unlikely to explain patrilineal cooperation.
The mean relatedness of males belonging to the same WEG was 0.32, which is a separation of slightly more than two generations and is higher than the average relatedness of half brothers (r p 0.25). Because relatedness within WEGs is high, kin selection is a viable hypothesis to explain cooperation in WEGs. Based on relatedness alone, we cannot assert that kin selection is operating. However, we can conclude that the benefit-to-cost ratio for a good deed would not need to be ridiculously high in Hamilton's Rule (Hamilton 1964a (Hamilton , 1964b .
Ethnographers working from different epistemological traditions agree that kinship by blood is important to social interactions in the Dogon (Bouju 1984:21; Paulme 1940; Strassmann 2011; Strassmann et al. 2012) . For example, they have noticed that WEGs tend to split apart along lines of genetic relatedness and that entry into the cash economy has accelerated this process. WEGs are prone to becoming nuclear families (albeit sometimes with a polygynous WEG boss). Large extended family WEGs have lower mean genetic relatedness, and they are becoming less common (see fig. 2B ). Ethnographers also agree that reciprocity is more frequent among relatives than among nonrelatives in the Dogon (Bouju 1984) . Further, they agree that the Dogon reject extramarital children (Paulme 1940) , especially if they are male and entitled to inherit land (Strassmann informants).
In the primary study village, 64% of the land was owned by WEGs and only 24% was owned by lineages. Even the lineage fields are not worked by the lineage as a whole; instead, they are worked by WEGs. Farming is the main source of livelihood for the Dogon, and it is done in groups in which the average coefficient of genetic relatedness among males is 0.32. Lineages do serve a function, especially in the realm of religion; however, economic work is done at lower levels of social organization where genetic relatedness is high. Average genetic relatedness of men belonging to the same patrilineage is so low (r p 0.03) that patrilineal kinship is "fictive" rather than genetic. However, it would be a mistake to permit the fictive kinship of patrilineages to obscure the genetic kinship of the social units that make up patrilineages. These units, or WEGs as we have called them, are the units that raise children (Strassmann 2011) and that provide the family with the means of subsistence.
At the study site, the Dogon are rapidly converting to Islam and, to a lesser extent, Christianity (Strassmann et al. 2012 ). WEGs but not patrilineages will endure the process of religious conversion. The newer religions are weakening the social fabric of patrilineages because they do not have any lineage-specific religious sites or activities that bring men together for collective action on behalf of the lineage. The world religions are not linked to the Dogon agricultural cycle, and they have no religious or political roles for lineage elders (Strassmann informants) . They also do away with menstrual huts and the system of communal mate guarding (Strassmann et al. 2012) . A famous quote by a Muslim man shows the ambivalence he feels about these changes: "As a planter, for the millet, the women and the children, one stays with the Dogon religion; for commerce and politics one follows Islam" (Parin, Morgenthaler, and Parin-Matthèy 1966:387) .
